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Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal by virtue of transfer and assignment from the 
Utah Supreme Court under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-2a-3(j) and 78-2-2(4)(2000). 
Issues Presented for Review 
Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants motion for summary judgment 
determining that the Appellees were negligent as a matter of law. 
Whether the trial court erred in granting Appellees motion for summary judgment 
barring the introduction of evidence of loss of anticipated future profits. 
Standard of Review 
In reviewing a denial or grant of summary judgment, an appellate court views "the 
facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below" and gives "no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law: those conclusions are reviewed for correctness." (Bearden 
v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, 428 Utah Adv. Rep. 18(Utah 2001) 2001 Utah Lexis 143, citing 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 119 P.2d 634, 636-37 (Utah 1989). Correctness is also 
the standard for review of questions of statutory interpretation. (See, Stephens v. 
Bonneville Travel Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997)) 
Rules determinative of Appeal 
Utah Rule Civil Procedure 41 (a)(1) 
" (a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and 
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of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without 
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the 
adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted 
under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the 
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as 
an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on 
or including the same claim." 
Statement of the case 
Appellants ( "Kitchens" as landowners/lessors and "Utah Sign" as lessees) hired 
the Appellees (hereinafter "Mitchell") to represent them as legal counsel in three identical 
cases all filed by a competing sign company and former tenant of the Kitchen property 
claiming ongoing leasehold rights to maintain outdoor advertising property owned by 
Kitchens and recentiy leased to Utah Sign. Two of those cases were voluntarily dismissed 
by the plaintiff before being served or answered. Instead of filing a motion to have the 
third and remaining matter dismissed under Utah R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1), Mitchell moved to 
have the dismissal of the first filed case vacated and to have the cases consolidated. The 
Court granted Mitchell's motion, and the Plaintiff therein subsequently received a ruling 
holding Utah Sign in violation of forcible entry thereby subjecting Utah Sign to a claim 
for substantial damages, a claim that was settled by Utah Sign giving up its claim to the 
disputed sign and sign site. Utah Sign then filed this suit against Mitchell and moved for 
partial summary judgment seeking a determination that the Mitchell's failure to seek and 
obtain dismissal of the sole remaining action under Utah R. Civ. P. 41 (a)(1) constituted 
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negligence as a matter of law. The trial court denied the motion ruling that material issues 
of fact remained for jury determination precluding summary judgment. 
Mitchell filed a motion for partial summary judgment seeking to prohibit Utah Sign 
from seeking loss of anticipated future profits from the outdoor advertising leasehold 
interest it lost after having to enter into a settlement following an unfavorable ruling in the 
non-dismissed action. The trial court granted that motion on the basis that Utah Sign was 
precluded from erecting a sign on its leasehold site by the erection of a competitors sign 
on adjacent property and within a 500 foot exclusion area established by governmental 
regulations. 
After Utah Sign amended its' discovery responses to indicate that the only damages 
being sought in this case were the anticipated lost future profits from a sign to be built on 
the disputed property, the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the case. This 
appeal is taken from the denial of Utah Sign's motion for summary judgment regarding 
negligence as a matter of law, the granting of Mitchell's partial summary judgment 
precluding claim for lost profits , and the granting of a final summary judgment. 
Statement of Facts 
(As to the Malpractice Motion) 
1. Lynn D. Kitchen and Beth K. Kitchen (hereinafter "Kitchens") own property 
adjacent Interstate 15 at approximately 435 West and 2750 South, South Salt Lake City, 
Utah (hereinafter "Kitchen property"). As a property adjacent the freeway, the Kitchen 
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property is highly desirable as a site for outdoor advertising. (R. 2; R. 456-462; 
Addendum 6) 
2. On May 12, 1973, Kitchens entered into a Sign Location Lease with R.O.A. 
General, Inc., d/b/a Reagan Outdoor Advertising (hereinafter "R.O. A.") for the Kitchen 
property. By its express terms, the R.O. A. sign location lease expired by August 5, 1993) 
(R. 835-837; Addendum 1) 
3. During the term of its lease with Kitchen, R.O.A. erected and maintained an 
outdoor advertising sign on the Kitchen Property.(R. 456-462; Addendum 6) 
4. In August, 1994, a dispute arose between Kitchens and R.O.A. concerning the 
R.O.A. sign location lease, the core issue being whether or not the lease terminated on 
August 5, 1993. In those conversations R.O. A. became aware of Kitchen's intent to re-
lease the property to a competitor, Utah Sign. (R. 942-943; Addendum 2) 
5. On August 29, 1994, consistent with their understanding that the R.O.A. lease 
had expired, Kitchens entered into an Outdoor Sign Location Lease with Utah Outdoor 
Advertising, Inc., d/b/a Utah Sign, Inc (hereinafter "Utah Sign ") regarding the Kitchen 
property.(R. 839-846; Addendum 3) 
6. On September 2, 1994, Utah Sign received a permit from the City of South Salt 
Lake to erect its own sign on the Kitchen property.1 (R. 565; Addendum 4) 
Mitchell asserted below that this permit was canceled, (R. 642) while omitting to 
disclose that it was subsequently reinstated. (R. 661; 689, 691,693) 
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7. On September 9, 1994, R.O. A. commenced an action against Kitchens in the 
Third Judicial District Court, case number 940905718 assigned to Judge David S. Young 
and referred to hereinafter as "the First Action." The Complaint stated four causes of 
action: 
(A) Breach of contract by sending a notice of termination of a valid, on-going lease; 
(B) Forcible Entry in violation of peaceful possession of leased property entitling 
the lessee to treble damages under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-10 (2000); 
(C) Interference with business relationships regarding customers who use the 
billboard for advertising; and 
(D) Specific performance of a leasehold interest of unique property. 
The prayer for relief was for $300,000 in actual damages, treble damages, and $100,000 
in punitive damages.(R. 456-462; Addendum 6) 
8. Dissatisfied with the assignment of the matter to Judge Young, R.O.A. 
commenced a second action in the same Court against the Kitchens three days later on 
September 12, 1994. This action, case number 940905728 was assigned to Judge Kenneth 
Rigtrip and is referred to hereinafter as "the Second Action."( Addendum 7) 
9. Again, dissatisfied with the second assignment, R.O. A. commenced yet a third 
action against the Kitchens the following day, September 13, 1994, case number 
940905780 which was assigned to Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki, hereinafter "the Third 
Action. "(R. 464-470; Addendum 8) 
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10. The Complaints in the First, Second and Third Actions were substantially 
identical. The central issue germane to each involved the right to maintain outdoor 
advertising on the Kitchen property and a claim for forcible entry and entitlement to treble 
damages. (R. R. 456-462; Addendum 6; Addendum 7; R. 464-470; Addendum 8) 
11. On October 8, 1994, Utah Sign removed the R.O.A. sign from the Kitchen 
property. ((R. 892) 
12. After its sign had been removed and while all three actions were pending 
R.O.A. elected to pursue the Second Action before Judge Rigtrip. Accordingly, on 
October 11, 1994 it dismissed under Utah R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1) the First Action (R. 3 1 
5; R. 22, 1 5; Addendum 10) , and three days later on October 14, 1994 it likewise 
dismissed the Third Action under the same rule.((R. 3 f 6; R. 22, 16; Addendum 11) 
13. Kitchens and Utah Sign retained the firm of Burbidge and Mitchell to represent 
them in the three actions filed by R.O.A. and the matter was handled by Stephen B. 
Mitchell (hereinafter collectively " Mitchell"). (R. 2, 1 5; R. 22 1 5) 
14. Upon learning of the filing of three separate actions and the dismissal of two 
of those actions, Mitchell did not assert the defense of res judicata as provided in Utah R. 
Civ. P. 41(a)(1), but, instead, filed a motion to vacate the notice of dismissal and to 
consolidate the three cases. (R. 877-882; Addendum 14) By virtue of said motion the trial 
court ultimately assigned to the matter determined that the defense of res judicata had been 
lost and Kitchens and Utah Sign had voluntarily elected to keep those matters "alive. "(R. 
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R. 888-889; Addendum 16; R. 497-521, Addendum 17) 
15. The consolidated cases proceeded to trial and the Court thereafter determined 
that although the R.O.A. lease expired on August 5, 1993, Kitchens and Utah Sign were 
guilty of forcible entry and had wrongfully removed the R.O. A. sign and were subject to 
treble damages. Kitchens and Utah Sign thereafter entered into a stipulated settlement 
of that claim wherein Utah Sign not only paid compensation to R.O. A., but also lost the 
leasehold interest in the Kitchen property sign site. (R. 573-580; Addendum 19) Mitchell 
now claims the R.O. A. sign precluded the erection of a sign on the Kitchen property by 
Utah Sign because of governmental regulations governing the spacing of signs in certain 
restricted areas. 
16. Kitchens and Utah Sign thereafter filed this action against Mitchell asserting 
that the failure to assert the defense of res judicata based up the two voluntary Rule 
41(a)(1) dismissals and the filing, instead, of a motion to vacate the dismissals and 
consolidate the actions constituted negligence on the part of Mitchell.(R. 1) 
17. Utah Sign filed a motion for [partial] summary judgment in this action 
requesting that the Court determine that Mitchell's conduct constituted negligence as a 
matter of law.(R. 440-441) 
18. Mitchell resisted the motion and filed his own motion for partial summary 
judgment requesting that the Court determine that Utah Sign's claim for loss of future 
anticipated profits from the Kitchen property sign site was barred as a matter of law 
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because it was precluded by R.O. A.s' erection of a sign on adjacent property preempting, 
under UDOT rules, usage of the Kitchen property site by Utah Sign.(R. 597-632) 
19. The Court denied Utah Sign's motion for [partial] summary judgment and 
granted Mitchell's motion for partial summary judgment barring any claim for lost 
profits.(R. 1004-1008; Addendum 20) A motion for certification was denied by the trial 
court (R. 1313-1315) and after Utah Sign filed amended responses to discovery indicating 
the absence of any additional claims against Mitchell other than the loss of "future 
anticipated profits" the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the case against 
Mitchell.(R. 1345-1347; Addendum 21) 
20. Utah Sign appeals from those decisions by the trial court. 
(As to the denial of loss of anticipated future profits) 
21. R.O. A. 's lease with Kitchen expired by its own terms on August 5, 1993, and 
was never renewed or extended. (Paragraph 2 of the R.O.A. Sign Lease, Exhibit "A" 
McDonald; AMENDED ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVISE 
RULING, R.O.A. General, Inc., v. Kitchen, 940905718CN, 2/15/96 (R. 835-837; 
Addendum 1; R. 547-550, Addendum 18) 
22. R.O.A. remained in possession of the property and paid the rental on the 
property through August, 1994.(R. 473-483, Exhibits thereto;) 
23. On August 29, 1994, Kitchens entered into a lease of the property with Utah 
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Sign.(R. 552-559; Addendum 3) 
24. On September 2, 1994, Utah Sign applied for and received permit #94-284 
from the City of South Salt Lake (hereinafter "city") allowing erection of a sign on the 
Kitchen property. At that time no other signs nor permits to build other signs existed 
within 500 feet of the Kitchen property, the govemmentally established spacing 
requirements for outdoor advertising within the subject environs.(R. 848; Addendum 4) 
25. On September 23, 1994, R.O.A. (notwithstanding its' pending suits seeking 
enforcement of an alleged ongoing, valid leasehold interest to maintain the sign on the 
Kitchen property) applied for and received permit #94-311 from the City of South Salt 
Lake to move a billboard on the Doctorman property located immediately adjacent the 
Kitchen property and a mere 166 feet from the position for which Utah Sign, 21 days 
earlier, had received permit #94-284.(R. 567; Addendum 9) 
26. To obtain the city permit, R.O.A. misrepresented to the city that the sign on 
the Kitchen property would "come down" thereby complying with the governmental 
spacing requirements. The city apparendy missed the fact that it had already issued to 
Utah Sign a permit for a sign on the Kitchen property, a fact also not disclosed to the city 
by R.O.A.(R. 1102-1127; R. 899-916) 
27. On September 24, 1994, R.O.A. used the wrongfully issued permit from the 
city to apply for and receive a permit from UDOT for erection of a sign on the Doctorman 
property, thereby wrongfully precluding the lawful erection of a sign by Utah Sign on the 
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Kitchen property because of the spacing requirements within UDOT's regulations.(R. 
8922-895; R. 1129) 
28. On October 8, 1994, Utah Sign erected a sign on the Kitchen property after 
submitting an application for a permit to do so to UDOT. UDOT denied a permit to Utah 
Sign on the basis that die R.O. A. permit for a sign on the adjacent Doctorman property 
preempted the erection of a sign on the Kitchen property. (R. 1093; R. 1102; R. 1115-
1116; R. 1138-1139) 
29. UDOT thereafter allowed both the R.O.A. sign on the Doctorman property 
and the Utah Sign on the Kitchen property to co-exist, notwithstanding the violation in 
spacing requirements, electing to await the outcome of litigation between the two sign 
companies and landowner to determine which company's sign could remain. (Id.) 
30. Reasoning that Utah Sign was precluded as a matter of law from erecting a sign 
on the Kitchen property by R.O.A.'s prior permit and erection, the trial court granted 
Mitchell's partial summary judgment barring Utah Sign from claiming lost anticipated 
profits from a sign on the Kitchen property as damages in this action.(R. 1004-1008; 
Addendum 20) 
Summary of Arguments 
Mitchell's conduct in failing to seek and obtain dismissal of the remaining R.O. A. 
suit against Kitchens and the filing of a motion to consolidate instead constitutes 
negligence as a matter of law and the trial court should have granted Utah Sign's motion 
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for partial summary judgment. 
Utah Sign had a legal right to establish a sign upon the Kitchen property which was 
not precluded by R.O.A.s wrongful conduct (the opportunity to undertake such conduct 
being in turn permitted by Mitchell's own negligence in not obtaining termination of the 
R.O.A. suits claiming entitlement to the Kitchen property under an expired lease), and 
therefore the trial court erred in granting Mitchell's motion for partial summary judgment 
barring evidence of lost anticipated profits as damages recoverable against Mitchell. 
Utah Sign seeks reversal of all three decisions by the trial court and remand of the 
case for trial consistent with this Courts decision. 
Argument 
POINT L 
THE CONDUCT OF MITCHELL CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE AS 
A MATTER OF LAW AND THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED 
KITCHEN'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
To sustain a claim of legal malpractice, a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of 
an attorney-client relationship, (2) the existence of a duty on the part of the lawyer, (3) 
the failure to perform that duty, and (4) that the negligence of the lawyer was the 
proximate cause of the damage to the client. ( Watkiss & Saperstein v. Williams, 304 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 15, 931 P.2d 840, 846 (Utah 1996) citing, Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 887, 
889 (Utah 1988) (plurality) (Howe, J.).) 
"[A]n attorney engaged in litigation must be conversant with the procedural 
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and substantive rules that govern the litigation of the action. See Hipwell v. 
Sharp, 858 P.2d 987, 989 (Utah 1993). "(Watkiss, Id.) 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1) is neither complex nor uncertain. It is clear, concise, 
elementary, basic and not subject to multiple exceptions, conflicting interpretation nor 
variance. It is a rule completely devoid of ambiguity as stated by the Utah Supreme Court. 
(Thomas v. Heirs of Barqffit, 305 P. 2d 507 (Utah 1956) citing, Robertshaw-Fulton 
Controls Co. v. Noma Electric Corp., 10 F.R.D 32, 34 (D.C.D.Md. 1950) It provides: 
"(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23(e), of Rule 66(i), and 
of any applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without 
order of court by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the 
adverse party of an answer or other response to the complaint permitted 
under these rules. Unless otherwise stated in the notice of dismissal, the 
dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as 
an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based 
on or including the same claim. (Emphasis added) 
This statutory adjudication upon the merits is dispositive, not only of the claims 
actually brought in the dismissed action(s), but those issues and claims "that could have 
been litigated" as well. (Searle Brothers v. Searle, 588 P. 2d 689, 690 (Utah 1978)) 
Courts elsewhere generally enforce the res judicata nature of the rule "even if the holding 
is unduly harsh,"(MerrillLynch,Peirce, Fenner & Smith v. Randall 110 FRD 499, 500 
(E.D. Cal. 1986) and make exceptions only in extreme and unusual circumstances. 
(Poloron Products v. LybrandRoss Bros. & Montgomery, 534 F. 2d 1012, 1017 (2nd Cir. 
1976); Manning v. S.C. Dept. ofHwy and Public Safety, 914 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1990) 
-12-
Therefore, Mitchell's failure to invoke 41(a)(1) and obtain dismissal of the remaining 
R.O.A. suit (a suit which thereafter had to be settled at severe consequence to Utah Sign) 
constitutes negligence as a matter of law. 
"Most courts hold that the issues of whether the lawyer erred and whether 
the error was caused by vagaries in the law raise questions of law to be 
decided by the court. See Hanlin v. Mitchelson, 623 F. Supp. 452, 456-57 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd, 794 F.2d 834 (2d Or. 1986); Martin v. Burns, 102 
Ariz. 341,429 P.2d 660, 662 (Ariz. 1967); Davis v. Damrell, 119 Cal. App. 
3d 883, 174 Cal. Rptr. 257, 259-60 (Ct. App. 1981); Allred v. Rabon, 572 
P.2d 979, 981 (Okla. 1977); CopelandLumber Yards, Inc. v. Kincaid, 69 
Ore. App. 35, 684 P.2d 13, 14 ( Or. Ct. App. 1984); Mallen & Smith at § 
17.7; accord Hipwell, 858 P.2d at 988-90. 
On appeal, we apply the same standards. Because the question of whether an 
attorney made an erroneous legal interpretation is a question of law, we will 
afford the trial court's decision no deference but review it for correctness. 
See Ong Infl (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 
1993)." (Watkiss, Id., (Utah 1996)) 
There are no " vagaries" as to whether or not to assert res judicata as a defense in 
this case. The law in this State regarding Rule 41(a)(1) is not "uncertain, unsettled, or 
debatable" and the Court can and should determine that a failure to assert such a basic 
defense is negligence as a matter of law. 
"Utah courts have held that expert testimony may be helpful, and in some 
cases necessary, in establishing the standard of care required in cases dealing 
with the duties owed by a particular profession. See Wycalis v. Guardian 
Title, 780 P.2d 821, 826 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Expert testimony is 
required "where the average person has little understanding of the duties 
owed by particular trades or professions," as in cases involving medical 
doctors, architects, and engineers. Id.; see also Hoopiiaina v. Intermountain 
Health Care, 740 P.2d 270, 271 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (requiring expert 
testimony to establish medical malpractice claim). Expert testimony may also 
be required to establish the duties owed by practicing attorneys to their 
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clients, especially in cases involving complex and involved allegations of 
malpractice. See Brown v. Small, 251 Mont. 414, 825 P.2d 1209, 1212-13 
(Mont. 1992) (requiring expert testimony to establish attorney standard of 
care in case involving insurance coverage). 
[However] In some cases, expert testimony may be unnecessary where the 
propriety of the defendant's conduct "is within the common knowledge and 
experience of the layman." Nixdorfv. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 
1980); See also, Brown, Id., at 1212 (acknowledging expert testimony 
unnecessary where misconduct" 'is so obvious that no reasonable juror could 
not comprehend the lawyer's breach of dutyMf (citation and emphasis 
omitted)) (Preston & Chambers v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 213 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Even Mitchell's present counsel has indicated that some actions or omissions by 
attorneys are so elementary as to constitute negligence as a matter of law, beyond any 
legitimate question or dispute. (See, Skolnick, "Understanding Legal Mapractice" 11-
Feb, UTAH BAR JOURNAL, 13, at 15, 1998). 
The trial court, when belatedly presented with a motion brought under the rule 
after Mitchell's termination and replacement in the case, recognized the simplicity and 
efficacy of the rule and acknowledged that he would have implemented its provisions and 
dismissed the R.O.A. claims2 but for Mitchells own conduct in seeking reinstatement and 
consolidation of the dismissed complaint thereby negligently subjecting his clients to 
litigation of barred claims: 
"The Court finds and rules as follows: normally, the two-dismissal rule 
would apply in this case, however, after the Plaintiff dismissed the second 
2Mitchell sought and received only an award of attorneys fees for having to deal 
with multiple cases, rather than seeking the dismissal afforded under the Rules. 
(R.685-687) 
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complaint, the defendants filed a motion to have the dismissal set aside, and 
the two cases that had been dismissed by Plaintiffs to be consolidated and to 
proceed. The Court finds that it was the decision of the Defendants to keep 
the case alive." (Citation) 
And later stating further, 
"Had you [Utah Sign] made the Motion to Dismiss [on] October 5, 1994, it 
doesn't appear there is much question about the fact that you would have 
prevailed, because there have been two dismissals of the same lawsuit. But 
the party who has most to gain from the status of the lawsuit at that point 
filed [a motion] to have the cases reinstated, [and the] notices of dismissals 
vacated. "3 
Mitchell's feeble attempt to distinguish the dismissed Complaints asserting that new 
and different claims were asserted in the Second Action is easily resolved by even a 
cursory reading of the Complaints.4 The claims are indistinguishable and are all based 
upon the same factual scenario and core issues; the legal theory of forcible entry and 
3As to the efficacy of the trial court's "rulings" cf. Harline v. Barker, 912 P. 2d 
433 (Utah 1996). 
4Mitchell argues that R.O.A.'s claim for damages for the cutting down of its sign 
by Utah Sign did not exist when the Complaints were filed on September 9, 1994 and 
September 13, 1994 respectively since the sign wasn't cut down until October 8, 1994. 
However, "forcible entry" was plead in all three Complaints, even if exacerbated by 
subsequent ongoing conduct of Utah Sign, and the "cutting sign down" additional 
damage claim did exist, even if not added to the Complaints by amendment, for from 
three to six days before the First and Third Actions were dismissed by R.O.A. on 
October 11, 1994 and October 14, 1994, respectively-thereby coming squarely within 
the holding in Searle barring claims asserted, or assertable. 
"[W]hen there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to 
those issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues 
which the party had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in 
the other proceedings." (Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303, 305 (Utah 
1985)) 
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prayers for relief are for all practical purposes, identical. All three Complaints alleged 
"forcible entry" and sought treble damages. 
Mitchell's conduct is such a blatant act of negligence that his actions should have 
been determined by the trial court to constitute negligence as a matter of law, obviating the 
necessity for expert witnesses to opine as to such conduct and Plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary judgment should have been granted. 
POINT n. 
A MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT EXISTS AS TO WHETHER R.O.A. 
HAD A VALID UDOT PERMIT FOR THE DOCTORMAN 
PROPERTY PRECLUDING UTAH SIGN FROM ERECTING A 
SIGN ON THE KITCHEN PROPERTY AND THE LOSS OF INCOME 
THEREFROM BEING CONSIDERED AS DAMAGES 
RECOVERABLE IN THIS ACTION 
No outdoor advertising may be erected or maintained within 500 feet of an existing 
sign located adjacent a federal highway. (UTAH CODE ANN. §27-12-136.5(2000)) No 
outdoor advertising can either be erected or maintained without a valid UDOT 
permit.(UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.7 (1)(2000); Utah Administrative Code 
R933-2-4 (1)). To acquire a valid UDOT permit for the erection of outdoor advertising 
an applicant must first obtain a valid city building permit. (UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-
136.11(3) (2000); Utah Administrative Code R933-2-4(15)(2000)) In order to obtain a 
UDOT permit, the sign applicant must have an ownership or possessory interest in or 
written permission to use the proposed land-site (Utah Administrative Code R933-2-2(12), 
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R933-2-4(l 1). Moreover, no sign can be constructed or maintained unless there is legal 
access to the property where the sign is situate. (Utah Administrative Code R933-2-
4(3)(2000)) Following the expiration of R.O.A.s' lease with Kitchens on August 5, 1993, 
R.O.A., in 1994, had at best, as argued by Mitchell below, an unwritten month-to-month 
tenancy based upon Kitchen's acceptance of monthly rent.5 However, UDOT permits are 
issued on an "annual" basis requiring proof of a leasehold interest of concurrent term of 
the UDOT permit. (Utah Administrative Code R933-2-4(10),(ll)) Therefore, from 
August 5, 1993 to September 1, 1994, R.O.A. had no written proof of an existing valid 
leasehold interest of any term other than a "month-to-month" tenancy and therefore could 
not have validly renewed its permit for the sign it had on the Kitchen property in June, 
1994. Accordingly, R.O.A. had no right to apply for a UDOT "407 Permit" to relocate 
its sign on the Kitchen property to the Doctorman property. After Utah Sign obtained 
a valid permit from the City to build a sign on the Kitchen property on September 2, 1994, 
issued in part based upon the required acknowledgment to the city of Utah Sign's leasehold 
interest and the notice to the city that R.O.A. had no possessory or access interest in the 
property, R.O.A. was precluded from obtaining a permit from the city, or from UDOT, 
for the erection of a sign on the Doctorman property because of the governmental 500 
5See Statement of Facts as to the express leasehold provision and finding of the 
Court as to the expiration and lack of renewal of the R.O.A. lease, and UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-36-3 (l)(a) provides that no further notification of termination thereof is 
required. 
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foot exclusionary regulations. 
The testimonial opinion of Arthur B. Coffin, a UDOT Permit Officer, that the R.O.A. 
permit on the Doctorman property was valid and precluded the erection of a sign on the 
Kitchen property by Utah Sign cannot serve as the basis for a summary judgment 
determining the preclusion of Utah Signs' claim for lost income from its proposed sign 
because (1) the opinion is a conclusion of law and not a statement of fact and should have 
been disregarded or stricken from the affidavit; (See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) requiring that 
affidavits must "set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence" and mere "legal 
conclusions" within an affidavit are not statements of "admissible fact" requiring 
challenge and must be disregarded by the Court. See, Capital Assets Fin. Servs. V. 
Lindsay, 340 Utah Adv. Rep. 49, 956 P.2d 1090 (Ct. App. 1998); Steffensen v. Smith's 
Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 491 (Utah App. 1991)); and (2) the opinion and 
conclusion is erroneous as a matter of law, or alternatively material facts existed which 
preclude such determination by summary judgment. 
R.O. A. 's city permit issued on die misrepresentation to the city that the sign on the 
Kitchen property "would come down" thereby avoiding the 500 foot exclusion was an 
invalid permit. City permits issued which violate the exclusionary provisions are "null and 
void" ab initio. (Ordinances of City of South Salt Lake § 15-3-2(c)) All it would take to 
cure that conflict would be to call to the city's attention the issuance of a preempting permit 
to Utah Sign issued by the city three weeks earlier. Mitchell surely does not get the 
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windfall protection of a city building permittee's oversight, or a competing sign companies 
lack of accuracy in disclosing the facts. Additionally, a false or misleading statement in 
a UDOT permit application invalidates the application. ( UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-
136.9(l)(c)) And, as stated previously, no UDOT permit for a sign may issue unless and 
until the applicant has a validly issued city permit. (UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-
136.11(3) (2000); Utah Administrative Code R933-2-4(15)(2000)) Therefore, the trial 
courts determination that Utah Sign's claims for lost future anticipated profits was barred 
as a matter of law is fatally flawed. Such a defense is both factually and legally 
insupportable as a matter of law, or at a minimum involves resolution of disputed facts 
precluding summary judgment barring recovery of such damages. 
In addition to the fact that R.O.A.s' invalidly issued permits cannot bar Utah 
Signs' claims for lost profits from a sign it had a legal right to erect, Mitchells own 
negligence in failing to timely dispose of the R.O. A. conflicting claim to the Kitchen 
property was itself the very reason Utah Sign was unable to obtain its UDOT permit for 
its sign on the Kitchen property. Mitchell cannot assert a defense to a claim for damages 
that said damages are non-recoverable and prohibited because of his own negligent 
conduct. (Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 
(Utah 1979)). Mitchell is estopped from asserting the denial of the UDOT permit (clearly 
occasioned by his own negligence) as a defense to the claim for damages. (Mendez v. State 
of Utah, 813 P. 2d 1234, 1236 (Utah App. 1991); Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113 
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(Utah 1985); /. P. Koch, Inc., v. J.C. Penny Company, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975)) 
Summary 
The trial court wrongfully determined that Mitchell's conduct was subject to factual 
determinations which precluded summary judgment. Mitchell's conduct and Rule 41(a)(1) 
is a matter of legal interpretation which should have been made by the trial court. The trial 
court further erred in holding that Utah Sign could not as a matter of law recover loss of 
anticipated future profits from a sign it proposed to erect on the Kitchen property. Utah 
Sign asserts that "but for" Mitchell's negligence in failing to timely obtain a Rule 41(a)(1) 
dismissal of the R.O.A. claims, a lingering dispute over leasehold, possessory and access 
rights to the Kitchen property persisted precluding the timely and orderly prosecution of 
applications seeking the permitting and maintenance of a sign by Utah Sign on the Kitchen 
property.6 
Relief Sought 
This Court should determine that Mitchell's conduct in filing a motion to consolidate 
the previously dismissed actions rather than summarily obtaining dismissal of the Third 
Action under the res judicata principles of Utah Rule Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is 
negligence as a matter of law obviating the necessity of expert witness testimony. 
This Court should reverse the trial courts summary determination that Utah Sign is 
6UDOT will not issue a [permit while there exists a dispute as to the underlying 
leasehold rights. (R. 892-895; R. 1129; Addendum 12) 
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precluded from seeking lost anticipated profits for a sign it erected on the Kitchen property 
and the case should be remanded back to the trial court for trial with Utah Sign permitted 
to show how it could have obtained a resolution of the conflicting permits, erected its sign 
and received substantial profits therefrom. 
DATED this fhi of December, 2001.. 
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